Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege by
the Trustee in Bankruptcy
The filing of a bankruptcy petition1 alters the way decisions

about the deployment of the debtor's2 assets are made. Such
changes fulfill the basic purpose of bankruptcy: to preserve and

enhance the debtor's assets and to satisfy, as far as possible, the
claims of the debtor's investors (i.e., all parties with legal claims
against the debtor)a through a collective proceeding. One of the
4

most significant of these changes is the appointment of a trustee
to administer the debtor's estate. 5 The Bankruptcy Code (the
I Bankruptcy petitions are governed by the Bankruptcy Code (the Code), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-151326 (as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353). The revised code has been published at 11 BANK. CT. DEC.
(CRR) (Issue 17, July 26, 1984) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 11 U.S.C. (1984
Revision) (CRR)]. A bankruptcy petition may be either voluntary or involuntary. A voluntary petition constitutes an order for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1984 Revision) (CRR).
Involuntary bankruptcy petitions become orders for relief only after court approval. See id.
§ 303. For the purposes of this comment, all events occurring "after the filing of a bankruptcy petition" are presumed to occur after an order for relief has been entered by the
bankruptcy court.
'A "debtor" is a "person or municipality concerning which a case under this title has
been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1984 Revision) (CRR). The Code defines a "person"
as an "individual, partnership, . .. [or]... corporation," but the definition excludes governmental units. Id. § 101(03). For additional debtor qualifications, see id. § 109.
3 The term "investor" includes any party with an ownership interest in the debtor's
assets. Thus, the term encompasses all creditors, stockholders, and other parties holding
contingent claims. This broad definition of ownership is necessary if bankruptcy is to be
understood as a collective proceeding. See Baird & Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand
the Treatment of Diverse OwnershipInterests: A Comment on Adequate Protectionof Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 97, 100 n.15 (1984). The term "residual
claimants" refers to those parties who have a claim on the debtor's assets but who take only
after all other claims have been satisfied. Technically, this term includes only equityholders;
when this comment addresses the duty of the bankruptcy trustee to maximize the estate for
the benefit of "residual claimants," however, it refers to general creditors as well as stockholders (though the claims of general creditors technically have a higher priority than the
claims of stockholders). This use is appropriate because trustee actions that have the effect
of maximizing the return to general creditors necessarily have the additional effect of increasing the likelihood of a return to stockholders. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying
text. For the listing of priorities under the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C § 726 (1984
Revision) (CRR).
4 The trustee is the court-appointed representative of the debtor's estate. See 11 U.S.C
§§ 321-325 (1984 Revision) (CRR).
5 The commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code creates an "estate." Id.
§ 541(a). The debtor's estate is the pool of assets, which is administered by the trustee in
bankruptcy and used to satisfy claims against the debtor. For a list of the types of property
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Code) 6 confers broad power on the trustee to manage the debtor's
estate;7 but because this delegation of power is necessarily general,
the task of defining the precise contours of the trustee's power has
devolved upon the courts.$ One question that courts have been
called upon to answer concerns the trustee's power to waive the
debtor's attorney-client privilege.
In recent litigation, trustees of both individual and corporate
debtors have claimed the power to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege in order to obtain information provided to the
debtor's attorneys prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition;'
they have argued that they need the privileged information to fulfill their duties to manage the debtor's business and to protect the
value of the estate. 10 The courts have failed to reach a consensus
that become part of the debtor's estate, see id. § 541. See generally Jackson, Translating
Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1985).
1 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982) (amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353). The Code was
preceded by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Bankruptcy Act), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976)) (repealed 1978).
7 For example, the trustee may use, sell, or lease property of the debtor's estate in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business without court approval and may do so outside the
ordinary course of the debtor's business after notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)-(c)(1)
(1984 Revision) (CRR). The trustee may also assume or reject executory contracts or
unexpired leases, id. § 365(a), and may operate the debtor's business during a reorganization, id. § 1108.
4 See, e.g., Farmer v. Crocker Nat'1 Bank (In re Swift Aire Lines), 30 Bankr. 490, 49596 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the trustee did not have the power under § 365 of
the Code to draw on a letter of credit when he was precluded from obtaining conforming
documents); In re Evelyn Byrnes, Inc., 32 Bankr. 825, 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding
that the trustee had the power to assume and assign an unexpired lease when the lease
required that the tenant maintain the "high standards of the building"); cf. NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 1194-95 (1984) (holding that the power of the debtor in
possession to avoid executory contracts under § 365 of the Code included the power to avoid
collective-bargaining agreements covered by the National Labor Relations Act and that unilateral modification of such contracts by the debtor in possession without prior court approval did not constitute an unfair labor practice).
I See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding that the trustee cannot waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege),
cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-261); Weissman v. Hassett (In
re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the trustee could
waive a debtor corporation's attorney-client privilege when the corporate officers had resigned); Citibank v. Andros (In re Citibank), 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
trustee could waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege); In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (allowing the trustee to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege
when the debtor was an individual); In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27
Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that a trustee could not waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege when the debtor was an individual).
10 The trustee has the duty to maximize the estate for the benefit of all investors,
whether they be creditors, equityholders, or tort claimants. See In re Washington Group,
Inc., 476 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1979) ("[T]he Trustee's duty is to act in the best
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on whether the trustee controls the debtor's attorney-client privilege."" Even those courts that agree that the trustee should be allowed to waive the debtor's privilege have differed over the precise
rationale for this conclusion. 12 In addition, some courts have conflated the issue of whether the trustee can waive a corporation's
interests of the Debtor's estate.") (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. Johnston v. Gilbert, 636
F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1982); DePinto v. United States, 407 F.
Supp. 5, 7 (D. Ariz. 1976) ("[The trustee] has a duty... to realize the maximum profit on
the bankruptcy estate."), aff'd, 585 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1978); B & L Farms Co. v. United
States, 238 F. Supp. 407, 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("[B]ankruptcy trustees do not represent
creditors alone. They must protect the interests of the bankrupt .... "); In re Transatlantic & Pac. Corp., 216 F. Supp. 546, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) ("[The trustee's] actions must be
compatible with the bankrupt's best interests as well as the interests of the bankrupt's creditors."); Baird & Jackson, supra note 3, at 101-09. Some courts, in addressing the trustee's
duty to maximize the assets of the debtor's estate, have described the trustee's duty as one
of maximizing the assets for the benefit of creditors, without reference to the interests of
investors generally. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir.
1965) ("The trustee... has the duty to realize the maximum from the estate for distribution to the creditors."); In re Benny, 29 Bankr. 754, 760 (N). Cal. 1983) (similar); In re
Crisp, 26 Bankr. 274, 275 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) ("The primary role of the trustee is to
administer the estate.., and to marshal for the benefit of the general creditors the maximum funds available for distribution."). These formulations result from the fact that the
majority of bankruptcy estates are insufficient to satisfy the claims of the debtor's creditors
and still have assets remaining for distribution to equityholders. In those cases, however, the
unsecured creditors referred to by the courts are, in reality, the debtor's residualclaimants.
See supra note 3. The trustee's duty to maximize the assets of the estate for the benefit of
investors requires the trustee to act in a manner most beneficial to equityholders when sufficient assets exist to satisfy the claims of the debtor's creditors and where the trustee's action will not pose an added risk to other investors. '
11 For cases in which the trustee was allowed to waive a corporate debtor's attorneyclient privilege, see Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383
(2d Cir. 1982); Citibank v. Andros (In re Citibank), 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981); Turner v.
Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers), 30 Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1983); In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1983); In re Silvio De
Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. SMD. Fla. 1982); In re Featherworks
Corp., 25 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11
CoLLIn BAmwi. CAs. (MB) 45 (Bankr. MD. Fla. 1976). Cf. In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th
Cir. 1984) (allowing an examiner, who had been given the power of a trustee by stipulation
of the parties, to waive the debtor's privilege); Week v. District Court, 422 P.2d 46, 161
Colo. 384 (1967) (en banc) (allowing the trustee in bankruptcy to waive a corporate debtor's
accountant-client privilege).
For cases holding that the trustee does not have the power to waive a corporate debtor's
attorney-client privilege, see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d
338 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-261); Ross
v. Popper, 9 Bankr. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hy-Gain Elecs. Corp., 11 Bankr. 119 (D. Neb.
1978).
For cases discussing the trustee's power to waive the attorney-client privilege when the
debtor is an individual, see Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 342-43 (dictum) (trustee may not waive
individual debtor's attorney-client privilege); Silvio De Lindegg, 27 Bankr. at 28 (holding of
the court) (same); In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. SD. Fla. 1982) (trustee can waive individual debtor's attorney-client privilege).
See infra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
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attorney-client privilege with the issue of whether he can waive an
individual's attorney-client privilege.13 These inconsistent approaches, and the differing outcomes to which they have led, result
from a failure to analyze the issue with the primary goal of bankruptcy in mind: maximizing the debtor's estate for the benefit of
all investors. The bankruptcy process achieves this goal by requiring the debtor's investors to participate in a collective proceeding. 14 The nature of this collective proceeding provides the framework for defining the scope of the trustee's powers.
This comment examines the trustee's power to waive the attorney-client privilege in both the corporate and individual-debtor
contexts, with special emphasis upon the former. After discussing
typical situations in which the issue arises and examining the
courts' treatment of the issue, the comment explicates the proper
analytical framework in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Butner v. United States.1 5 The core of the Butner
holding is that the touchstone of rights within bankruptcy is
nonbankruptcy law. It is necessary that some changes in the
debtor's situation occur upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition;
the appointment of a trustee is an example of such a change. Nevertheless, the proper way to gauge the effect of those changes on
the rights of parties involved in a bankruptcy proceeding is to
analogize the change to a similar event in nonbankruptcy law and
then to use this analogy to establish the substantive rights of the
parties in bankruptcy. With this analytical framework in mind, the
comment explores the nature of the attorney-client privilege
outside of bankruptcy. The comment then argues that, in the case
of a corporate debtor, the appointment of a trustee most closely
Is See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th
Cir. 1984) (if a trustee is given control of the attorney-client privilege of a corporate debtor,
then a trustee must also be given control of the debtor's attorney-client privilege in the case
of an individual debtor), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-261);
In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (citing cases that allow waiver of the privilege when the debtor is a corporation as precedent for allowing waiver when the debtor is an
individual). But see In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., In, 27 Bankr. 28, 28
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) ("[T]here is no reason why the trustee cannot waive a corporate
debtor's attorney-client privilege. There is every reason.., why the trustee cannot waive an
individual debtor's attorney-client privilege.").
1, For a discussion of bankruptcy as a collective proceeding, see Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). Professor Jackson argues that the return to all investors is maximized in bankruptcy because
the bankruptcy mechanism causes the assets of the estate to be deployed in the same manner that they would be deployed by a sole owner of the assets. Id. at 859-71; see also Baird
& Jackson, supra note 3, at 101-09.
1 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
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resembles a change in management and that, in the case of an individual debtor, it resembles a sale of the debtor's assets. The comment concludes that, under this analysis, the trustee has the power
to waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege only when the
debtor is a corporation.
I.

THE PROBLEM OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

IN BANKRUPTCY

A.

The Waiver Issue

Before examining the trustee's power to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege, it is necessary to examine the contexts in
which the issue usually arises. While the situations may appear
similar whether a corporate or individual debtor is involved, the
considerations involved in the two cases vary considerably.
To illustrate the issue in the case of a corporate debtor, assume that A, B, and C are the only directors of Debtor Corporation, a manufacturer of sporting goods. Throughout its existence,
Debtor Corporation has employed Law Firm as its corporate counsel. During their tenure as directors, A, B, and C have met frequently with Law Firm to discuss the legal ramifications of the
board's decisions. In order to assist Law Firm in giving its advice,
Debtor Corporation has communicated information concerning its
financial condition to Law Firm."' By March 1, retail sales of
sporting goods have declined sharply, and Debtor Corporation has
begun to experience cash-flow problems. On April 1, Debtor Corporation realizes that it cannot meet its financial obligations to a local bank, and the bank threatens to foreclose on the goods in
Debtor Corporation's warehouse. Debtor Corporation files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in chapter 7,17 and on April 10, Trustee
26 For the purposes of this comment, the attorney-client privilege is assumed to cover
all relevant discussions between the debtor and its attorneys. The requirements for the privilege have been summarized as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORH, EVMENCE § 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (setting forth
similar requirements).
17 Corporate liquidations and corporate reorganizations in bankruptcy are governed by

separate chapters of the Code. Compare 11 U.S.C. ch. 7 (1984 Revision) (CRR) (liquidations) with id. ch. 11 (reorganizations). For the purposes of this comment, it is immaterial

whether the debtor is involved in a liquidation or a reorganization. The manner in which the
debtor's assets are to be deployed and the "allocation of rights among the parties to a bank-
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is appointed by the bankruptcy court to handle the affairs of
Debtor Corporation.
On May 1, Trustee authorizes an audit of Debtor Corporation.
The audit reveals that several million dollars of receivables that
Debtor Corporation's financial records indicate were collected cannot be traced to any of Debtor Corporation's bank accounts. During this period, the Internal Revenue Service notices some inconsistencies in the individual tax returns of the directors, and the
IRS begins a comprehensive investigation of the financial transactions of A, B, and C. In the course of its investigation, the IRS asks
Trustee for Debtor Corporation's internal audits. Trustee cannot
find any of Debtor Corporation's internal audits. In order to assist
its investigation, the IRS requests that Trustee waive Debtor Corporation's attorney-client privilege as to the financial information
communicated to Law Firm. Trustee also wishes to obtain this information in order to decide whether to pursue a civil action
against the directors for breach of their fiduciary duties. 18 Trustee
asks Law Firm for the financial information, but Law Firm declines on the ground that Debtor Corporation's attorney-client
privilege prevents such disclosure. Trustee brings a motion in the
bankruptcy court to compel disclosure by Law Firm, and A, B, and
C intervene seeking to assert the attorney-client privilege in their
role as Debtor Corporation's directors.
A similar situation can occur with an individual debtor. To illustrate this, assume that Debtor, an individual, owns and operates
a small sporting goods store as a proprietorship. Debtor regularly
communicates to his counsel, Attorney, information concerning his
financial condition so that Attorney can give advice to Debtor
about the legal ramifications of certain transactions. On March 1,
Debtor's business begins to decline and on April 1, Debtor files for
bankruptcy. 19 On April 10, Trustee is appointed to manage the as-

ruptey proceeding are distinct issues; because it is in the best interest of all the investors to
maximize the amount available for distribution, the determination of each of these questions should be made independently of the other. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 3, at
101-09.
In chapter 7 proceedings, trustees are elected by the debtor's creditors. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1984 Revision) (CRR). In chapter 11 proceedings, a trustee may be appointed when
such appointment is in the best interest of the estate. See id. § 1104(a). If a trustee is not
appointed, the current management continues to manage the debtor in the capacity of a
"debtor in possession," enjoying the same rights, powers, and duties as a trustee. See id.

§ 1107.
I" For a collection of cases and articles on the subject of fiduciary duties and suits for
breach thereof, see Dm.xv VAGTS, BAsic CORPORATION LAw 207-98 (2d ed. 1979).
11 Individual bankruptcies are governed by 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (1984 Revision) (CRR).
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sets of Debtor.20 On April 15, the Internal Revenue Service begins
an audit of Debtor's tax return, and on May 1, the IRS requests
Debtor's receipts. Debtor refuses to hand them over. The IRS then
asks Attorney to deliver any information he has regarding the operation of Debtor's store. Attorney refuses to produce the requested information on the ground that doing so would violate
Debtor's attorney-client privilege. The IRS then asks Trustee to
waive Debtor's attorney-client privilege so that it can gain access
to the information it needs. Trustee, who would like to see this
information himself so he can trace all of Debtor's assets, petitions
the bankruptcy court for permission to waive the attorney-client
privilege. Debtor opposes this motion.
B. The Case Law
At least three courts of appeals and a number of lower federal
courts have recently considered whether a trustee in bankruptcy
has the power to assert or waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege
with respect to communications preceding the filing of a bankruptcy petition.2 1 A majority of these courts have allowed the trustee to control the privilege when the debtor is a corporation. The
language and legislative history of the Code give no direct guidance
in resolving this issue, 22 however, and the courts have used differing rationales to arrive at this conclusion.
Some courts have justified their finding that the trustee controls the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege on the ground
that the privilege is property of the estate, which passes to the
trustee along with the other assets of the debtor.23 Other courts
20

In individual bankruptcies, trustees are always appointed by the court. See id.

§ 1302.

See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
Section 542 permits a court to require any person holding recorded information relating to the debtor to turn over such information to the trustee, but only "[s]ubject to any
applicable privilege." 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (1984 Revision) (CRR). The legislative history
merely states that "[tihe extent to which the attorney-client privilege is valid against the
trustee is unclear under current law and is left to be determined by the courts on a case by
21

case basis." 124 CONG. RC.32,400 (1978).
23 See, e.g., Citibank v. Andros (In re Citibank), 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981); cf.

In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984) (relying on the Citibank decision in allowing an
examiner who had been given the power of a trustee by stipulation of the parties to waive
the debtor's privilege). But see In re Hy-Gain Elecs., Inc., 11 Bankr. 119 (D. Neb. 1978)
(holding that the right to waive a corporation's attorney-client privilege was not a form of
property that became part of the bankrupt's estate under the Bankruptcy Act); cf. In re

O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 61 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (holding that the waiver
right passes to the bankruptcy trustee under the Code, but conceding that the court in Hy-

Gain "may be" correct in stating that "'the privilege is itself a privilege and not a form of
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have based their conclusion on the fact that the trustee must have
the power to waive the privilege in order to fulfill his duties as
representative of the estate.24 Moreover, a number of courts have
relied on both these rationales in allowing the trustee to waive a
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege.2 5 Finally, one court has
relied on both rationales in allowing the trustee to waive an individual debtor's attorney-client privilege. 26 A small number of
courts, however, have refused to recognize any right on the part of
the trustee to waive or assert the debtor's attorney-client privilege. 7 Close examination reveals that each of the rationales offered
property' ") (quoting In re Hy-Gain Elecs., Inc., 11 Bankr. 119, 120 (D. Neb. 1978)), aff'd, 13
Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing
Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); In re McCourt, 12 Bankr. 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding that a surviving spouse's right of election is a personal right and is not § 541
property).
" See, e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 13
Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing
Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982). In granting the trustee the power to waive the
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege, the bankruptcy court in O.P.M. Leasing relied
in part on the fact that the proceeding was in chapter 11 and in part on the fact that the
debtor had consented to the appointment of a trustee. See 13 Bankr. at 62. The court did
not explain, however, how these arguments support the proposition that the trustee possesses the waiver right, and these arguments are in fact insufficient to support the court's
conclusion.
The court's first argument creates an unprincipled distinction between chapter 7 cases,
where a trustee is required, see 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1984 Revision) (CRR), and chapter 11
cases, where a trustee may not be required, see § 1104. In chapter 11 cases, the estate may
instead be administered by a debtor in possession with powers virtually identical to those of
the trustee. See id. § 1107. Furthermore, there are other reasons why it is not mandatory
that a trustee be appointed in a chapter 11 case. For example, not requiring a trustee allows
"debtors, creditors, and equityholders greater flexibility in handling the affairs of an insolvent debtor, permitting the court to tailor the remedy to the case." H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 403 (1977). Consent by the debtor to the appointment of a trustee may thus
have little or nothing to do with the notion that the trustee serves as a representative of the
debtor. The court's argument based on the debtor's consent to the appointment of the trustee is also unsound because there is no basis for permitting a corporate debtor's decision to
have a trustee appointed to add to the trustee's powers when the trustee's powers under the
statute are equivalent to those that the debtor in possession would have in the absence of
such an appointment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1984 Revision) (CRR). Moreover, creditors may
have enough leverage to force a corporation's consent to the appointment of a trustee. What
may appear to be voluntary consent may thus not be voluntary at all. See D. BA=W & T.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERL41S ON BANKRuPTCY CIL 2 (forthcoming). Thus, management's approval of a trustee's appointment is immaterial to the determination of
whether it is the trustee or the corporate debtor's directors that should be deemed representative of the debtor for the purposes of waiver.
25 See Turner v. Davis, Gillenwater & Lynch (In re Investment Bankers, Inc.), 30
Bankr. 883 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re National Trade Corp., 28 Bankr. 872 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
1983); In re Featherworks Corp., 25 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
'6 In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3, 5 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (citing cases employing both
rationales).
2" See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir.
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by the courts is either inconsistent with the language and structure
of the Code or unpersuasive.
The assertion that the debtor's attorney-client privilege passes
to the trustee as property of the estate is inconsistent with the language of the Code. Section 541 defines property of the estate as
"all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case,""8 and section 542 provides that, with
certain exceptions, such property shall be turned over to the trustee.29 Yet the right to assert or waive the attorney-client privilege
is not a right that can be bought, sold, or levied upon by creditors,30 and none of the cases offering this property argument discusses the nature of the privilege or the propriety of characterizing
it as property within the meaning of section 541. Because the attorney-client privilege cannot be considered "property" within the
definition of that term in section 541, it cannot be treated as something that is turned over to the trustee under the requirements of
section 542.
It is also unpersuasive to justify vesting the power to waive the
privilege in the trustee based on the characterization of the trustee
as the representative of the estate. Courts employing this rationale
essentially make the following argument. The attorney-client privilege exists "to protect and foster the interests of actual litigants," 1
and the trustee is the party representing the property interests of
the debtor in litigation; if the right to waive the privilege were
vested in the officers or directors, rather than in the trustee, the
privilege would fail to benefit the litigating party it was designed
to protect;32 therefore, the trustee should have the power to exercise the privilege as he wishes. This argument suffers from two
flaws. First, it assumes that the privilege is closely linked to the
property rights belonging to the estate, that those rights pass to
the trustee, and that, when such rights pass to the trustee, the
privilege follows. But under the Code, there is no transfer of property to the trustee. The trustee is only "the representative of the
1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984) (No. 84-261); Ross v. Popper, 9

Bankr. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Hy-Gain Elecs. Corp., 11 Bankr. 119 (D. Neb. 1978).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
" Id. § 542.

" Cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (holding that a seat on the
Chicago Board of Trade was property of the estate in part because the member "can transfer it or sell it subject to a right of his creditors to prevent his transfer or sale till he settles
with them,--a right in some respects similar to the typical Hen of the common law .... ").
31 Gorman v. Martinez (In re Amjoe, Inc.), 11 CoLLmR B~wJL CAs. (MB) 45, 49

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1976).
n Id.
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estate";33 no change in ownership is contemplated.34 Thus, this argument does not explain why the trustee, rather than the corporate debtor's directors or an individual debtor, should have the
power to waive the privilege.
Second, by focusing attention on the question of which party
has control of the debtor's property, this argument fails to distinguish between individual and corporate debtors. As this comment
will show,3 5 the concerns involved in assessing the issue in the context of an individual debtor are so fundamentally different from
those involved with a corporate debtor that the issue of whether
the trustee can waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege must be
addressed separately in each situation.
The most important case addressing the issue of the power of
a trustee in bankruptcy to control the attorney-client privilege of a
corporate debtor is Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Weintraub.3 6 In Weintraub, the Seventh Circuit held that the corporate directors, and not the trustee, control the debtor's attorneyclient privilege. This decision offers the most thorough argument
to date for denying the trustee the power to waive the privilege.
The court gave four justifications for this conclusion. First, the
court concluded that, because the trustee does not "succeed to the
positions of the officers and directors of the corporation," the
granting of broad powers to the trustee under the Code does not
also vest control over the privilege in the trustee.3 The corporation
still exists after a petition in bankruptcy is filed, and "is capable of
performing numerous functions."38 Thus, while the trustee may
gain control over the corporate debtor's property, he does not also
gain absolute control over its legal rights. Second, assuming that
the trustee could not waive an individual's attorney-client privilege, the court asserted that to allow the trustee to waive the privi- 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
" A limited right of waiver may accompany the transfer of an interest in property, but
the right to waive is transferred only to the extent necessary to ensure the realization of the
transfer of the underlying property interest. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2329, at 639; cf.
Hoffman, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BAM. L.J. 231, 248 (1979) ("The significant difference between ownership and representation would appear to be crucial to the
ability to equate a trustee with an assignee."). Thus, even if the debtor's property is considered to have been transferred to the trustee, the privilege cannot be said to have followed,
because it is not necessary to perfect the transfer of any property in the estate.
See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984)
(No. 84-261).
37 722 F.2d at 342.
38d.
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lege in the case of a corporation would result in an unequal treatment of individual and corporate debtors.8 9 Third, the court
reasoned that allowing the trustee to waive the attorney-client
privilege would amount to "discriminat[ion] against the corporate
debtor on the basis of economic status. ' 40 The court implied that it
would be unfair to transfer control of a corporation's attorney-client privilege merely because its status had changed from that of a
solvent corporation to that of an insolvent one.41 Finally, the court
concluded that allowing a debtor's attorney-client privilege to be
waived by the trustee would have a chilling effect on attorney-client communications, thus defeating the very purpose the privilege
seeks to further.4 2
The Seventh Circuit properly began its analysis by examining
the powers of the trustee.4 Nevertheless, the court did not explain
why an examination of the relationship between the powers vested
in the trustee and those retained by the corporate management is
relevant, and it did not carry the analysis far enough. The remaining three justifications given by the court are also unsatisfactory
because they fail to take into account the unique situation of a
trustee in bankruptcy, the underlying purposes of the bankruptcy
process, and the considerations that justify disparate treatment of
corporate and individual debtors.
The issue of whether the debtor or the trustee controls the
attorney-client privilege in bankruptcy is only one of a number of
issues that the Code fails to address explicitly. 44 As in all cases

'

Id. at 342-43.

40 Id. at 343.
41 This reasoning assumes that once the privilege is vested in the trustee of a corporate
debtor, the trustee will use the privilege in a manner that is contrary to the best interest of
the corporation. This comment will show, infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text, that
this assumption is incorrect.
42

722 F.2d at 343.

For a justification of this analysis, see infra notes 46-62 and accompanying text.
" The Code's legislative history offers little aid in the resolution of the general issue.
The drafters of section 542(e), which deals with the turnover of financial information to the
trustee, stated that "[the turnover] duty is subject to any applicable claim of privilege, such
as the attorney-client privilege." H.R. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (1977); see
also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1978). Other statements made during the
discussion of section 542(e), however, explicitly indicate that this issue was left open. See
supra note 22.
One could argue that because there is no specific grant of authority in the Code, the
trustee does not have the power to waive the attorney-client privilege. But one could also
argue that, in the absence of a congressional expression of intent, a court must follow the
nonbankruptcy rule and allow the trustee, as current management, to waive the privilege.
The discussion in the legislative history indicates that an approach that denies the trustee
control of the corporate debtor's privilege based solely upon the absence of a specific grant
43
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where the Code is silent on an issue and where the courts are expected to deal with the problem on a "case by case basis,"45 the
issue should be resolved with the help of a general theoretical
framework of bankruptcy in mind. This is especially important
where the legislative history is almost completely silent on the issue, and one has only the general purposes behind the bankruptcy
process to rely on. Before returning to a detailed critique of the
Weintraub decision, the following sections of this comment develop the appropriate framework for resolving issues that the Code
does not address.
II. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF RIGHTS IN BANKRuPTcy

Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
which party controls a debtor's attorney-client privilege, it has answered the more general question of how rights should be distributed in bankruptcy when federal bankruptcy law fails to provide a
specific solution. In Butner v. United States,4" the Court was faced
with the issue of how the bankruptcy court should distribute rents
that had accrued and been paid to the debtor's estate during the
bankruptcy proceeding4 7 -an issue that was not expressly addressed by any provision of the Bankruptcy Act.48 More generally,
the Court was called upon to decide whether state law (i.e., the
rule that would apply outside of bankruptcy) or a federal rule of
equity (i.e., a rule to be applied only in bankruptcy) should govern
the determination. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held: "Property interests are created and defined by state law... [T]here is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.",49 The Court stressed that state (i.e., nonbankruptcy) law
would always apply in such situations, "[u]nless some federal interest requires a different result." 50
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court emphasized the conse-

of authority in the Code is overly formalistic and was not intended by the Code's drafters. If
anything, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress was not going to clarify the
issue one way or the other and that the courts would have to rely on broader principles to
resolve it. As is the case with any ambiguous delegation of power to the trustee, defining the
specific bounds of the trustee's powers is a proper task for the courts.
"5 See supra note 22.
4"440 U.S. 48 (1979).
47Id. at 49-51.
4sId. at 54.
41Id. at 55.
" Id.
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quences of a contrary holding: 51 "Uniform treatment of property
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to
reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a
party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.' "52 These considerations all stem from a
concern about the incentives created by the bankruptcy process
whenever the rules within bankruptcy differ from those outside of
bankruptcy. In the particular situation facing the Court in Butner,
no federal interest would have been served by applying a rule other
than the one provided by state law; the only effect would have
been to give parties an incentive to obtain the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court to resolve an issue more favorably than would be
possible under state law.5 3
Butner thus creates a presumption that rights inside of bankruptcy are coextensive with rights outside of bankruptcy. If bankruptcy were to change the substantive rights of the parties involved in a proceeding, then certain parties might receive a
windfall through the "happenstance of bankruptcy." As the Court
indicated, such a result would be justified only if a "federal inter-

"1The

Court's decision also seemed to rest in part on a federal-law preemption

analysis:
"The Federal Constitution, Article 1, § 8, gives Congress the power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. In view of this
grant of authority to the Congress it has been settled from an early date that state laws
to the extent that they conflict with the laws of Congress, enacted under its constitutional authority, on the subject of bankruptcies are suspended. While this is true, state
laws are thus suspended only to the extent of actual conflict with the system provided
by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress."
440 U.S. at 54 n.9 (quoting Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)) (citations omitted). Under this approach, state law always applies, even in bankruptcy, unless there is a
conflicting, and thus overriding, federal interest in providing a uniform rule in a particular
situation. This form of analysis alone, however, does not fully resolve the problem of the
determination of rights where the Code is silent. For example, the Court's opinion does not
expressly state that the overriding "federal interest" must be determined by Congress
through the bankruptcy statute, and it seems to leave room for the courts to apply their own
uniform federal rules where a "federal interest" is compelling. The Court's opinion seems,
however, to indicate that such questions can only be addressed by looking at the purposes to
be served by the bankruptcy system and the way in which the incentives created by a particular rule relate to those purposes.
52 Id. at 55 (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
0 In furtherance of the goal of ensuring that rights within bankruptcy are the same as
those outside of bankruptcy, the Court placed on the bankruptcy court an affirmative duty
to protect the state law rights of parties: "[T]he federal bankruptcy court should take
whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy
court the same protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued." 440
U.S. at 56. This duty even requires the bankruptcy court to assure that any delay in granting a remedy to which a party is entitled under state law be no greater than that which
would be necessary in a state court. Id. at 56-57.
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est" were involved. The definition of what constitutes a sufficient
federal interest can only be determined with reference to the underlying purpose of the bankruptcy process: preserving and enhancing the assets of the debtor.
To illustrate a situation in which an unjustified windfall might
arise from a change in rights under bankruptcy, assume that under
state law an individual cannot sell his seat on a board of trade
without first paying off his debts to the board and its members. If
bankruptcy law did not recognize this state-law limitation on the
disposition of the seat, general creditors (who, outside of bankruptcy, could only receive the proceeds from the sale of the seat
after the board had been paid in full) would share the proceeds
from the sale of a debtor's seat proportionally with the board."
Thus, if a bankruptcy trustee could sell the seat without first paying off the debts to the board, nonmember creditors would have an
incentive to force the debtor into bankruptcy in order to take advantage of the favorable change in their substantive rights. Conversely, creditors who were members of the board would have an
incentive to keep the debtor out of bankruptcy until the seat could
be sold, in order to preserve their right to be paid in full. These
incentives might cause the decision to enter into or stay out of
bankruptcy to be made without regard to the appropriateness of
using the bankruptcy process.
The Butner analysis of the determination of property rights
within bankruptcy applies with equal force to the determination of
nonproperty rights, including control of the attorney-client privilege. This is shown by the fact that a similar kind of unjustified
windfall might arise if control of the attorney-client privilege did
not depend upon nonbankruptcy law. Returning to the example
used earlier,' 5 assume that, outside of bankruptcy, directors A, B,
and C are, because of an impending corporate takeover, about to
lose the right to assert Debtor Corporation's attorney-client privilege. If bankruptcy law did not mirror the way in which nonbankruptcy law distributes this right, A, B, and C could file a petition
in bankruptcy on behalf of Debtor Corporation merely to ensure
that they will not lose control over Debtor's attorney-client privilege. No, bankruptcy purpose is served by granting A, B, and C this
" These facts are based loosely upon those of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 1 (1924), where the Court held that the bankruptcy court must enforce the Board's
"Hen" on the seat and require that the Board be paid in full before any proceeds could go to
the debtor's estate. 264 U.S. at 14-15.
" See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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windfall." Under this analysis, it is irrelevant that Butner dealt
with state-created rights while the attorney-client privilege in
bankruptcy is governed by federal law. The crux of the Butner
analysis is that one party should not obtain a windfall due to the
mere "happenstance of bankruptcy." The appropriate concern is
with the effect of altering rights in bankruptcy, rather than with
the source of the rights.
This application of Butner also comports with the "creditors'
bargain" model of bankruptcy, which views bankruptcy law as the
set of rules creditors would contract for ex ante if such negotiations were possible.57 Because creditors would contract for a proceeding that recognizes all nonbankruptcy entitlements while
preventing piecemeal liquidation of the debtor in state-court pro-

" The same skewed incentive that is created by a change in the way property rights are
treated in bankruptcy thus results when other, nonproperty rights are altered within the
bankruptcy forum. Assume, for example, that the directors of Debtor Corporation know that
the corporation is financially troubled and susceptible to a takeover bid and that the directors fear that the disclosure of privileged information could result in personal liability, either criminal or civil Outside of bankruptcy, if Debtor Corporation is taken over by Parent
Corporation and if Parent Corporation installs X, Y, and Z as directors of Debtor Corporation, X, Y, and Z would then have the power to waive the privilege for the benefit of Debtor
Corporation's owners. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. If the trustee in bankruptcy
could not waive the privilege on behalf of the corporation, the current directors would have
an incentive to file a bankruptcy petition. This incentive for A, B, and C to enter Debtor
Corporation into bankruptcy would arise not because the bankruptcy forum results in an
allocation of the Debtor Corporation's assets more beneficial to the investors, but because
the bankruptcy forum would offer them a favorable change in their substantive rights. If,
inside bankruptcy, Trustee has the power to waive the privilege, then A, B, and C have
nothing to gain by filing a petition in bankruptcy because, whether a petition is filed or not,
the current management of Debtor Corporation, not A, B, and C, will possess the waiver
right.
The creditors of Debtor Corporation would also have a skewed incentive if the right to
waive the attorney-client privilege within bankruptcy were determined differently than it is
outside of bankruptcy. In deciding whether to force Debtor Corporation into bankruptcy,
they would have to weigh the benefits of a collective proceeding against the probability that
information concerning a possible breach of duty on the part of Debtor Corporation's directors would be unavailable. Such information, if obtained, could be used to recover damages
against the directors and thus increase Debtor Corporation's estate for the benefit of all
creditors. Rather than pursue a possibly more beneficial bankruptcy proceeding, the creditors might wait, pursue their state-law remedies, and hope that either the corporation would
be acquired or new management would be elected by the shareholders and the information
would be revealed.
Such skewed incentives occur whenever there is a change in the substantive rights of
parties involved in a bankruptcy proceeding and the change is made for a purpose other
than to facilitate a collective proceeding. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 3, at 97-109;
Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. RIv. 953, 953-59 (1981); Jackson,
supra note 14, at 857-71; Jackson, supra note 5, at 73-77.
" See generally Baird & Jackson, supra note 3, at 97-109; Jackson, supra note 14, at
859-71.
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ceedings, bankruptcy is viewed merely as a procedural forum for
sorting out nonbankruptcy entitlements.' 5 These entitlements
should be altered only when there is a bankruptcy reason for doing
so." Thus, under this normative theory of bankruptcy, the attorney-client privilege should be allocated according to nonbankruptcy law, unless some bankruptcy reason exists for not doing so.
This normative view of bankruptcy recognizes that some
changes must occur within bankruptcy in order to facilitate the
collective proceeding. The appointment of a trustee is an example
of such a change. Because the trustee exists only within bankruptcy, one cannot merely assert that bankruptcy rights should
mirror nonbankruptcy rights in defining the powers of the trustee.
Here again, however, the Butner analysis provides guidance. The
trustee is given certain powers and duties that would otherwise be
exercised by others outside of bankruptcy,0e as well as certain powers and duties that are possessed only by trustees in bankruptcy."1
In order to determine whether a power normally held by others
should be exercised by the trustee, one must compare the role of
the trustee with the role of those who would exercise the power
outside of bankruptcy. If the role of the trustee is sufficiently analogous to that of another party who exercises a certain power
outside of bankruptcy, then the trustee should have that power
within bankruptcy. Under this approach, no party could gain a
windfall in bankruptcy from a change in substantive rights.
The proper framework for analyzing the power of the trustee
with respect to the attorney-client privilege is this: first, the scope
of the attorney-client privilege outside of bankruptcy must be defined; next, the appointment of a trustee must be analogized to a
similar transfer of power outside of bankruptcy; finally, the effect
this change would have on the attorney-client privilege outside of
bankruptcy must be determined. Under this framework, the role of
the trustee in bankruptcy is most closely analogous, in the case of
a corporate debtor, to that of new management, and thus the trustee should possess the same power to waive the attorney-client
privilege that new management would have outside of

" See Baird & Jackson, supra note 3, at 97-109; Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 956-59;
Jackson, supra note 14, at 859-71.

" See sources cited supra note 58.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1984 Revision) (CRR) (allowing the trustee to use
property of the debtor's estate in the ordinary course of business); id. § 364 (allowing the
trustee to incur unsecured debt in the operation of the debtor's business).
11 See, e.g., id. § 547 (allowing the trustee to recover certain asset transfers as voidable
preferences); id. § 544 (allowing the trustee to avoid unperfected security interests).
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bankruptcy.6 2

H.

THm PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE IN NoNBANKRuPTcy LAW

Of all the privileges for communications developed at common
law, the attorney-client privilege is the oldest.63 The purpose of the
privilege is to assure that clients' communications with their lawyers will not be chilled by the prospect that the lawyer may later
be forced to divulge sensitive information to others." Lawyers will
thus be more fully informed in representing the interests of their
clients and will therefore be able to give sounder legal advice and
advocate their clients' cases more effectively: the privilege exists to
"encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice." 65 The attorneyclient privilege applies to litigation in the federal courts 6 and attaches to corporations as well as to individuals.6 7 Because the privilege by its very nature serves to prevent disclosure, however,
courts have restricted its scope." An example of such a limitation
is the rule that the directors of a corporation who divulge information to the corporation's attorney may not control the privilege as
to that communication indefinitely: a new board of directors is free
to waive the privilege."
*' See infra notes 81-113 and accompanying text.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16,
§ 2291.
65 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980); see also Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
"FED. R. EviD. 501; Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
67 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1980); see also United States v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915).
"See, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1960) ("[The attorneyclient privilege] is to be strictly limited to the purposes for which it exists."); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("[Privileges] are developed and
expanded only to accomodate needs that can be narrowly defined and, when so defined,
require protection to a greater degree than does the need for testimony."), affd, 570 F.2d
562 (6th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
("IT]he privilege has been confined to a narrow and limited enclave.... [T]he privilege is
strictly limited in purpose and effect.").
69 See, e.g., Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383, 386
(2d Cir. 1982) ("'It is axiomatic that the power to invoke or waive the privilege lies in the
corporate client acting through its board of directors or management. .. .' ") (quoting the
court below, 13 Bankr. 54, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599
F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1979) ("If the employees had engaged in questionable activity, the
corporation clearly would have the power to waive the privilege and to turn the employees'

1984]

Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy

1247

When a trustee in bankruptcy seeks control of the attorneyclient privilege to assist him in pursuing litigation in bankruptcy
courts, he seeks control of the federal privilege.7 0 In those rare instances in which the trustee seeks control of the privilege for use in
state court proceedings, he seeks control of the privilege as it is
defined under state law.7 1 For purposes of convenience, this comment will assume that the rules governing the privilege under state
72
law are the same as the federal-law rules.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides the general rule
with respect to privileges in federal proceedings, states that "the
privilege of a witness, [or] person . . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-

statements over to law enforcement officials.. . ."); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 611 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) ("Ordinarily, the privilege belongs to the
corporation and an employee cannot himself claim the attorney-client privilege and prevent
disclosure of communications between himself and the corporation's counsel ...."); In re
O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("One who communicates with
corporate counsel, including an officer, director, shareholder or employee by virtue of his or
her role in the corporation, must recognize that it is the corporation, as the client, which
may waive or assert the privilege."), aff'd sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M.
Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F.
Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("[I]n the absence of any indication to the company's
lawyer that the lawyer is to act in any other capacity than as lawyer for the company...
the privilege is and should remain that of the company and not that of the communicating
officer."), aff'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); cf. Kidston, Current Developments in Attorney-Client Privilege, 36 Bus. LAW. 701, 706 (1981) (employees should be given a warning
that the corporation might later waive the privilege); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
A Look at Its Effect on the CorporateClient and the CorporateExecutive, 55 IND. L.J. 407,
411 (1980) (corporation may decide to waive the attorney-client privilege as to previous
communications between another officer and the corporation's counsel); Note, The LawyerClient Privilege:Its Application to Corporations,the Rule of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rav. 235, 243-44 (1961) (The waiver decision can only be made by
someone whose authority is derived from the current board of directors). But cf. Sexton, A
Post-Upjohn Consideration of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,57 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
443, 509-10 (1982). Professor Sexton argues that the privilege arising from communications
between an employee and corporate counsel cannot be disclosed by the corporate counsel
unless both the corporation and the employee waive the privilege. If this view is adopted,
however, its effect should not be limited to the bankruptcy context. See supra notes 52-62
and accompanying text.
70 FED.R. Evm. 501 would govern the privilege in bankruptcy litigation, since the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to evidentiary determinations in the bankruptcy courts. See
BANK. R. 9017; FED. R. Evm. 101, 1101.
71 Cf. Weck v. District Court, 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d 46 (1967) (trustee seeking control
of debtor's accountant-client privilege as defined under state law).
72 Under the analysis developed in this comment, differences in the scope or control of
the privilege between state and federal law may be material to whether the trustee may
obtain control over the privilege. Where such differences exist, the law that provides the
appropriate rules of decision will be determinative.
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ence. ' 7 3 In the hypothetical situation discussed above, 74 A, B, and
C, as directors of Debtor Corporation, could, in a nonbankruptcy
proceeding governed by federal law, assert Debtor Corporation's
attorney-client privilege for the benefit of Debtor Corporation with
respect to the privileged communications. Law Firm would then be
precluded from disclosing those communications to the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation of Debtor Corporation and its directors. 5
Nevertheless, the ability of A, B, and C to assert Debtor Corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to the information
communicated to Law Firm does not continue forever, even though
they were Debtor Corporation's directors at the time the privileged
information was given to Law Firm. For example, assume that Law
Firm received the same information as in the hypothetical, but instead of a petition in bankruptcy having been filed, Debtor Corporation had convened its annual shareholders' meeting and a new
board of directors was elected to replace A, B, and C. Shortly
thereafter, the new board, at the request of the IRS, waived
Debtor Corporation's privilege over the objections of A, B, and C.
Because the attorney-client privilege is considered to belong exclusively to the corporation and because the new board can waive or
assert the privilege as it chooses,/ Law Firm would have to disclose the information despite the protests of the former directors.
The directors of a corporation thus take a certain risk when
they give confidential information to the corporation's attorneys.
Although they are the agents of the corporation vested with exclusive control over the decision to waive the privilege, they must be
aware that such control will last only so long as they remain directors of the corporation. There could be a voluntary or involuntary
change in ownership, or management could fall out of favor with
the stockholders." Thus, under nonbankruptcy law, control over
the decision to waive or assert the attorney-client privilege belongs
73 FED.

R. Evm. 501.

7" See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.

75 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 649 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd,
570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); see also In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 57-58
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 13 Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), af/'d sub nom. Weissman v. Hassett
(In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
' See supra note 69 and accompanying text.

7" See, e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) ("Ex-

isting management may change its collective mind, or there may be a change in manage-

ment, resulting from a sale of the corporation or because of a voluntary or involuntary
transfer of control within the corporation."), af'd, 13 Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd sub

nom. Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).

1984]

Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy

1249

to the corporation itself, not to any particular set of individuals,
and can only be exercised by the group of individuals that represents the corporation as directors at the time the decision is made.
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, an individual
debtor stands in a much different position than a corporation's directors. Under nonbankruptcy law, only the individual himself has
the power to waive his attorney-client privilege; he cannot lose this
privilege through the actions of third parties.7 8 This difference between the treatment of corporate directors and individuals results
from a fundamental difference between the two types of entities
involved.7 9 Unlike an individual, a corporation is an artificial entity
that can act only through its agents. Thus, in order to assert or
waive its attorney-client privilege, a corporation must place the authority to make the decision in particular agents. Although a corporation's attorney-client privilege exists until it is waived, the authority of any particular agent of the corporation to control the
privilege lasts only so long as the agency relationship exists. Thus,
unlike an individual's power over his attorney-client privilege, the
directors' control of a corporation's privilege rests on their relationship to the corporation rather than on a right that is personal
to themselves.
IV.

APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE

Outside of bankruptcy, the management 0 of a corporation
controls the corporation's attorney-client privilege."' Thus, under
the Butner analysis, the trustee should be able to control this privilege if, but only if, he occupies a position analogous to that of new
management outside of bankruptcy. The powers of management,
as defined by state law and most corporate charters, are extensive.
It has complete control over the day-to-day operations of the corporation.8 2 It controls any litigation involving the corporation.8"
7S See EDWARD CLEARY, McCoRmcK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 93, at 194
(2d ed. 1972).
71 See, e.g., In re Silvio De Lindegg Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982) ("An individual can be sent to prison on the testimony of his attorney divulging a
confidence. A corporation cannot suffer any penalty greater than the loss of its fiscal assets

In practice, a large corporation is typically managed by its top officers, but their legal
authority derives from that of the board of directors. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAUn. L.
Rzv. 375 passim (1975). The distinctions generally drawn between officers and directors do
not affect the trustee's right to control a debtor's attorney-client privilege.
" See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
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Management is also given authority to make many decisions
outside the ordinary course of business." Along with this extensive
grant of power, directors are under certain fiduciary duties, the
most important of which is the duty to maximize the corporation's
profits for the benefit of its shareholders. 5
The powers and duties of the trustee in bankruptcy are strikingly similar to those of the corporation's management outside of
bankruptcy. The Code gives the trustee the authority to oversee all
of the debtor's operations within "the ordinary course of business,""6 and the trustee has a duty under the Code to maximize the
value of the debtor's estate for the benefit of the debtor's investors
as a group.87 Perhaps most relevant to the determination of who
controls the debtor's attorney-client privilege is the trustee's power
to dictate the course of litigation pending at the time of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition, which also mirrors the control given a
corporation's board of directors outside of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
Rule 6009 allows the trustee to assume control of any litigation
" An exception would be shareholder derivative litigation. But even this form of litigation may be subject to control by the board of directors through special litigation committees. The ability of such committees to terminate derivative litigation on behalf of the corporation,however, is unclear under current law. Compare Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d
Cir. 1982) (in cases where shareholder demand is futile and where the special litigation committee is independent, the committee's decision to terminate the suit will be upheld if the
court determines that the cost of litigation exceeds the amount of recovery discounted by
the probability of success), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983), with Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (where the members of the committee
did not act in bad faith, the "business judgment" rule will apply to their decision to terminate derivative litigation).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 243 (1983) (board of directors has the power to
retire shares of the corporation's stock); id. § 244 (providing a number of methods by which
the board of directors may alter the corporation's capital structure).
" The duty of the corporation's directors to maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders has long been recognized. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507,
170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919) ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.
The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.").
" 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1984 Revision) (CRR) ("[T]he trustee may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business,
without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of
business without notice or a hearing."). Compare this with the description of management's
duties in PERCIVA JACKSON, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT § 153c (1955) ("[M]atters that center
about the daily and current operations of the business and its administration, are functions
to be exercised by the full-time employees and executives of the company, the operating
management.").
87 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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that may affect the debtor's estate." The trustee may even terminate suits in which the expected return to the estate is less than
the expected cost of litigation.89
If the appointment of a trustee is not to be considered a
change in management, the reason for the distinction must lie in
the relative powers of the trustee and management to conduct operations outside of the ordinary course of business and in the nature of the duties owed by each to the corporation's residual claimants. The principal distinction between management outside of
bankruptcy and the trustee in bankruptcy is the Code's requirement that the trustee obtain court approval for the use, sale, or
lease of estate property outside of the ordinary course of the
debtor's business.90 This restriction contrasts with the much wider
" BANKR. R. 6009 ("With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in possession
may prosecute or enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or
against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the
estate before any tribunal"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (1984 Revision) (CRR) ("The trustee in a case under this title has capacity to sue and be sued."); Meyer v. Flemming, 327
U.S. 161, 168 (1946) ("[T]he trustee or receiver, being in a position to take control of the
litigation by reason of the fact that the cause of action has become a part of the estate,
should have the opportunity to make the choice which is most advantageous to the estate.");
2 Couana ON BANKRupTcy 1 323.02 (15th ed. 1984).
" See 2 CoLuiRs ON BANxupTPCY, supra note 88, at {323.02. If control over the debtor's
attorney-client privilege is vested in the trustee, the trustee must fulfill his duty to maximize the estate's assets by basing any decision to waive the privilege upon a finding that
waiver is in the best interest of residual claimants as a group. The trustee would have to
weigh the expected costs of releasing the information-for example, criminal penalties that
might be assessed against the corporation-against the expected benefits to be gained by
bringing the information out into the open-for example, damages that might be recovered
on behalf of the corporation in a suit for breach of fiduciary duty against the directors. If
the trustee finds that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, then he must waive
the privilege for the benefit of the estate.
There are many circumstances in which waiver of the attorney-client privilege would be
beneficial to the corporation. For example, if the trustee entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS in exchange for release of the privileged information, the debtor's investors would benefit because the agreement would extinguish a contingent claim against the
estate. Moreover, a conviction of the debtor's directors could increase the value of the estate
by enhancing the possibility of recovery in a suit against the directors for breach of fiduciary
duty.
It should be noted that the decisionmaking method described here for a trustee is identical to the one that a corporate debtor's directors would be under a duty to employ if the
decision were vested in them. If the release of the privileged information might lead to
recovery against the directors in favor of the corporation, they may be obligated to waive
the privilege even against their own interest. See supra note 85 and accompanying text;
infra notes 107-14 and accompanying text. While directors have no duty to waive the privilege when only creditors could benefit from any recovery, the trustee does have a duty to
waive the privilege for the benefit of creditors. In either case, however, the privilege must be
used in a manner that furthers the best interest of the firm's residual claimants.
- 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
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discretion given to directors in managing their corporations.91 This
distinction, however, does not justify treating the trustee as something other than the new management of the corporation. It can be
explained, rather, as an attempt to reduce agency costs 2 in bankruptcy to a level equal to those outside of bankruptcy. Code restrictions on the power of the trustee to act unilaterally are bankruptcy's functional equivalent of legal restrictions on management's behavior outside of bankruptcy.
Agency costs arise whenever there is a separation of ownership
and control.9 3 Because management's interests and incentives may
differ from those of the corporation's investors, there is a risk that
the firm's investors will suffer an economic loss-an agency
cost-through management behavior that is not in the investors'
best interests." A similar agency-cost problem exists within bankruptcy because the trustee's interests may differ from those of the
debtor's investors. Outside of bankruptcy, however, mechanisms
exist to reduce these costs. 9 5 In bankruptcy, these mechanisms no

92 See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (corporate directors
are liable for breach of duty only when their decisions do not show a reasonable exercise of
business judgment).
"3 For a definition of agency costs, see infra note 94.
" For a discussion of the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
control, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 70003 (1982).
"See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("[Algency costs [are] the sum of:
(1) the monitoring expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent,
(3) the residual loss." (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
It is important to note that when there is a separation of ownership and control agency
costs can never be reduced to zero. In order to minimize agency costs, bonding and monitoring mechanisms must be implemented up to the point where their marginal cost equals the
marginal savings. For example, management would not spend $10,000 to eliminate all employee theft when the maximum losses from such theft would never exceed $5000 in the
absence of the safeguard. The goal of mechanisms intended to reduce agency costs, both
within and outside of bankruptcy, is to reduce the residual loss, but only to the point where
it is efficient to do so. Thus, outside of bankruptcy, shareholder approval is required only for
certain major decisions made by the board of directors, see infra note 103 and accompanying text, not for decisions concerning the day-to-day operations of the firm. Similarly, bankruptcy law requires that the monitoring mechanism of court approval be used only where
the trustee's decisions are made outside "the ordinary course of business." See 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(b) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
" Mechanisms for reducing agency costs between management and shareholders include the market for corporate capital, the market for corporate control, the market for
corporate management, and fiduciary duties imposed by law on corporate directors and officers. See RALPH WIrr=n, GoVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 7-44 (1978); Fame, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-98 (1980); Jensen &
Ruback, The Market for CorporateControl, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-30 (1983). Agency costs
that directly affect the firm's creditors are usually handled by explicit contractual provisions
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longer apply."8 Thus, the Code contains provisions designed to assure that the trustee's actions will be in the best interest of the
debtor's investors. These provisions deal with four principal
agency-cost problems.
First, agency costs increase when the trustee lacks a comprehensive familiarity with the debtor's business and, through ignorance, makes major decisions concerning the debtor's operations
that are not in the debtor's best interest.9 7 In order to alleviate this
problem, the Code requires court approval for certain decisions,9"
thus providing an opportunity for parties who are more familiar
with the operations of the debtor to have input into important decisions. 9 In this manner, the Code seeks to ensure that the same
expertise that would be used in making major business decisions
outside of bankruptcy will be used within bankruptcy.
Second, creditors can ordinarily minimize their agency costs
through contractual restrictions on the corporation's ability to dispose of its assets; 10 0 in bankruptcy, however, creditors need the
special protection afforded by a judicial hearing because the filing
of a bankruptcy petition renders many of these contractual provisions unenforceable. 10 1 Thus, the Code substitutes the requirement
of court approval for the usual contractual safeguards. 102

intended to constrain management behavior that may be detrimental to the creditors. See
infra notes 102, 111 and accompanying text.
"The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers the Code's automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (1984 Revision) (CRR), which prevents claimants from pursuing any remedies
against the debtor without leave from the bankruptcy court. Claimants must, therefore, rely
on the bankruptcy mechanism to satisfy their claims.
"Outside of bankruptcy, directors can be elected by shareholders for their performance or expertise. The efficiency of corporate management is also checked by market mechanisms, see supra note 95.
95 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1984 Revision) (CRR) (notice and hearing required for
the use, sale, or lease of property by the trustee outside the ordinary course of business); id.
§ 364(b) (notice and hearing required for the trustee to obtain unsecured credit outside the
ordinary course of business).
"Investors often will have more expertise in the debtor's business than the trustee
does. Because any increase in the value of the debtor's assets accrues to the benefit of these
investors, they have an incentive to intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings and convince
the judge of the merits of their objections to the trustee's proposed actions.
'00 See supra note 95; infra note 111.
1o See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
102 See supra note 98. Private bonding and monitoring mechanisms, freely used outside
of bankruptcy, are less feasible within bankruptcy because the creditors have little bargaining power over the trustee. In order to restrain the kinds of behavior within bankruptcy that
these mechanisms normally limit outside of bankruptcy, bankruptcy imposes the quasi-public monitoring mechanism of court approval. While monitoring costs are thus increased
under either system, the monitoring functions of both systems serve to reduce the residual
loss to the firm's investors and thus reduce overall agency costs.
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Third, bankruptcy precludes the use of a shareholder-approval
requirement for major transactions. Outside of bankruptcy, merger
agreements or agreements to sell a substantial amount of a firm's
assets usually require shareholder approval."' 3 This requirement
reduces agency costs by directly taking into account the interests
of a majority of the shareholders-as indicated by their votesbefore the corporation enters into the transaction. Because the potential economic loss to investors from an erroneous decision by
the directors is so great in these situations, the relatively cumbersome mechanism of prior approval is cost-justified.1 " Bankruptcy
eliminates this effective means of controlling agency costs and puts
in its place a notice and hearing procedure for certain transactions
entered into by the trustee; this procedure assures, before certain
transactions are entered into, that decisions made will probably be
in the best interests of the residual claimants.10 5
103 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1983) (requiring shareholder approval of
mergers or consolidations between domestic corporations); id. § 271 (requiring shareholder
approval of a sale, lease, or exchange of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets).
104. Other mechanisms for reducing agency costs usually operate by providing ex post
remedies for improper behavior. For example, shareholder derivative actions for breach of
fiduciary duties or contractual guarantees in loan agreements give directors an incentive to
behave properly in order to avoid liability later. Nevertheless, these incentives will not always prevent improper decisions from being made, and it may be difficult to detect breaches
or recover damages after the fact. Thus, the requirement of shareholder approval may be
worthwhile to prevent breaches before they happen, at least where the stakes are sufficiently
high to justify the additional cost. A similar rationale lies behind requirements, in some loan
agreements, for prior creditor approval of certain corporate decisions or even for placing a
creditor-representative on the board of directors.
105The method by which trustees are appointed is also similar to the method by which
directors are appointed in nonbankruptcy law. In chapter 7 proceedings, trustees are elected
by the creditors, with each creditor's vote being proportionate to his share of the total claim
against the debtor. 11 U.S.C § 702 (1984 Revision) (CRR). Corporate directors are elected
by the corporation's shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1983). Each
shareholdeg is usually entitled to vote for directors, with the shareholder's vote being proportionate to the shareholder's ownership interest in the corporation. See, e.g., id. § 212
("Unless otherwise provided in the certificates of incorporation ... each stockholder shall
be entitled to one vote for each share of capital stock held by such stockholder."); cf. id.
§ 214 (allowing corporations to provide for cumulative voting in their certificates of incorporation). See generally D. VAGTs, supra note 18, at 395-413.
In chapter 11 proceedings, a trustee can be appointed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104
(1984 Revision) (CRR) when such appointment is in the best interest of the debtor's investors. If a trustee is not appointed, the current management continues to manage the debtor
in the capacity of "debtor in possession." Id. § 1107. Although, in these situations, the decision to appoint a trustee or to leave the debtor in possession is not made pursuant to a vote
of claimants, the mechanism is designed to assure that the decision will be made in their
best interests.
Trustee-removal procedure is also similar to the removal of directors in nonbankruptcy
law. Trustees may be removed by the bankruptcy court after notice and a hearing. See id.
§§ 324, 1105. Similarly, directors may be removed by a vote of a majority of shareholders on
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Finally, the trustee is more closely scrutinized by courts and
owners than are directors outside of bankruptcy because the most
effective control over the agency costs that are caused by directors'
behavior is absent in bankruptcy: there is nothing like the market
for corporate management or corporate control that exists outside
of bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy, if the managers of a corporation fail to run the corporation effectively, they may be replaced
by more effective directors either through a vote of dissatisfied existing shareholders or through a change of corporate control facilitated by lower prices for the corporation's stock. 100 This mechanism provides the greatest assurance that, outside of bankruptcy,
the managers of a corporation will pursue goals that are in the best
interests of the corporation's shareholders. Outside of bankruptcy,
the markets for corporate control and corporate management reduce the shareholders' agency costs; inside of bankruptcy, the opportunity for judicial review and the requirement of notice to all
investors, including residual claimants, serve as substitute mechanisms for controlling these agency costs.
Since the Code grants the trustee powers analogous to those of
management outside of bankruptcy, the only reason for not treating the trustee as new management would have to be that the trustee's duties differ significantly from those of new management,
thus indicating that the trustee might waive or assert the attorneyclient privilege in a different manner than would new management.
But an analysis of the duties of the trustee in bankruptcy reveals
that they are similar to those imposed on a corporation's management. Outside of bankruptcy, a corporation's management owes a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders to maximize the corporation's
profits. 10 7 Similarly, trustees in bankruptcy have a duty to the
08
debtor's investors to maximize the assets of the estate.
the specific question of the director's removal, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)
(1983), or by shareholder approval of other nominees for director at the shareholders' meeting, see, e.g., id. § 211(b).
2" [The] divergence of interests between principals and agents may be controlled by
the operation of the employment market. An unfaithful or indolent agent may be penalized by a lower salary, and a diligent agent may be rewarded by a bonus for good
performance. In addition, the threat of sales of corporate control induces managers to
perform well in order to keep their positions. Finally, competition in product markets

helps to control agents' conduct, because a poorly-managed firm cannot survive in competition with a well-managed firm (other things being equal).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 93, at 701; see also Fama, supra note 95, at 288-98; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 95, at 6-7. Trustees, on the other hand, may be removed only for
cause, see 11 U.S.C. § 324 (1984 Revision) (CRR), and are not threatened by takeovers.
107 See

supra note 85. These duties are generally imposed by state law.
I" See supra note 10; see, e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177, 181
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There is a distinction between the categories of investors to
whom the corporate directors and the trustee in bankruptcy owe
their duties: the fiduciary duties of corporate directors run to
shareholders, not creditors, while creditors' rights are the dominant concern of a bankruptcy trustee. 10 9 This distinction, however,
is one of terminology rather than substance. When a debtor enters
bankruptcy, it is usually because the debtor is insolvent-i.e., it
cannot satisfy all claims against its assets. 110 The purpose of the
trustee's duty to maximize the estate's assets is to assure that the
greatest possible sum is made available to satisfy those claims.
Outside of bankruptcy, creditors can protect their claims on the
corporation through contractual provisions such as "events of default,"111 which trigger an immediate obligation by the corporation
to pay off the debt in full when certain events occur. These clauses
(8th Cir. 1965) ("[The trustee] has the duty to call to the court's attention any error in an
order affecting the estate ... ."); In re Washington Group, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 247
(M.D.N.C. 1979) (bankruptcy court and the trustee exceeded authority by authorizing funds
to be spent from the debtor's estate in order to subsidize litigation that could result in no
benefit to the estate and was, therefore, adverse to the interests of both stockholders and
creditors), aff'd sub nom. Johnston v. Collins, 636 F.2d 1213 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 940 (1981); Second Nat'l Bank v. Marcincin (In re Nadler), 8 Bankr. 330, 332
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) ("The trustee's fiduciary obligation to conserve estate assets, so as to
maximize distribution to creditors, is also implied by other duties imposed upon him by the
bankruptcy law ... ."); cf. United States ex rel. Willoughby v. Howard, 302 U.S. 445, 454
(1938) (the trustee in bankruptcy has a duty to use ordinary care in the making of deposits
and a failure in this respect will give rise to liability).
'0"See supra notes 10 & 85.
110 The Code defines "insolvent" for an entity other than a partnership as
[a] financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of
such entity's property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of(i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the estate under section
522 of this title ....
11 U.S.C. § 101(29)(A) (1984 Revision) (CRR).
11" Exactly what constitutes an "event of default" is usually negotiated as part of a loan
agreement:
The objective in specifying events of default in a loan agreement is to describe those
circumstances in which the lender (or a percentage of lenders) should have the right to
terminate the lending relationship-that is, the right to terminate the lending commitment and to declare due and payable any outstanding loans.... This right is primarily important to bank lenders for getting the attention of and negotiating with a
financially or otherwise troubled borrower, or with other creditors of that borrower, in
order to effect other measures, like restructuring the credit, or obtaining guaranties or
collateral or other credit support, or selling assets.
Ryan, Defaults and Remedies under InternationalBank Loan Agreements with Foreign
Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's Perspective,1982 U. ILu. L. Rav. 89, 90. For a
discussion of some specific examples of events of default, see id. at 90-100.
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become unenforcable once a bankruptcy petition is filed.112 Once
the corporation enters bankruptcy, creditors (much like shareholders outside of bankruptcy) must rely on the expertise and good
faith of those who control the corporation's affairs to preserve their
capital. Outside of bankruptcy, the reliance of shareholders on the
judgment of the corporation's directors is supported by the directors' duty to maximize profits. By imposing upon the trustee a
duty to maximize the estate's assets, the Code compensates the
creditors for their inability to rely on the contractual protection
they enjoyed outside of bankruptcy.
Directors and trustees thus seek to accomplish the same goal
for the corporation: achieving the greatest return for the residual
claimants of the enterprise. Because agency costs tend to increase
when a debtor enters bankruptcy, the Code provides mechanisms
for decreasing these costs. As a result, the trustee occupies a position that closely approximates the position of a director before the
filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Because the trustee finds himself in a situation similar to that
of new directors outside of bankruptcy, and because a new board
of directors has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege, the Butner analysis s requires that the trustee be
permitted to control the debtor's attorney-client privilege. If the
trustee's power to control the attorney-client privilege differed
from the power to control the privilege enjoyed by a new board of
directors outside of bankruptcy, there would be a substantive
change in the rights of the parties due to the mere happenstance of
bankruptcy. The Supreme Court's decision in Butner prohibits
such a change. 114
V. OBJECTIONS TO ALLOWING THE TRUSTEE TO CONTROL THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: Commodity Futures Trading

Commission v. Weintraub
11 5
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,
the Seventh Circuit held that the trustee does not control the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. The court gave several

11 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1984 Revision) (CRR). The changes in the rights of parties
caused by the automatic stay are necessary for a collective proceeding. In order to avoid a
piecemeal liquidation of the estate, the stay prevents parties from pursuing their state-law
remedies.
See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
':s 722 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3310 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1984)
(No. 84-261). See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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justifications for its conclusion; perhaps the most compelling is the
argument that because the trustee should not be permitted to
waive an individual debtor's attorney-client privilege, permitting a
trustee to waive a corporate debtor's privilege would result in discriminatory treatment of corporations. This section will examine
the Seventh Circuit's arguments, and will in particular show why
disparate treatment of corporate and individual debtors is appropriate.
A.

The Problem of Individual Debtors

The Weintraub court argued that a rule allowing the trustee
to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege would have
to apply in the case of an individual debtor as well. 11e Because it
would be "absurd" to permit a trustee, who may conduct a public
examination of an individual debtor," 7 to waive the individual's
privilege during such an examination, the court concluded that the
trustee could never waive the privilege on behalf of either a corporate or an individual debtor." 8 One court, however, has allowed the
trustee to waive the individual debtor's attorney-client privilege;" °
in so doing, it relied on cases that allowed the trustee to waive a
corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege. 2 0
The problem with both lines of analysis is the assumption that
individual and corporate debtors must be treated alike, when in
fact there are compelling reasons for applying a different rule in
each case.' 2 ' The trustee should be allowed to waive the corporate
debtor's attorney-client privilege because the appointment of a
trustee in that context is analogous to a change in management
outside of bankruptcy. There is no corresponding "management,"
however, to direct the affairs of an individual outside of bankruptcy. 22 Thus, the trustee should be permitted to waive an individual debtor's attorney-client privilege only if some other, analoI's 722

F.2d at 342-43.

217 See 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1984 Revision) (CRR).
722 F.2d at 343.
In re Smith, 24 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
110 Id. at 5.
11
11

11 Indeed, the fact that Congress has established separate rules for bankruptcies of
corporations and individuals, compare 11 U.S.C. chs. 7, 11 (1984 Revision) (CRR) (liquida-

tion and reorganization of corporations) with id. ch. 13 (adjustment of debts of individuals),
implies that rules developed in one context should not be automatically applied in the
other.
." Assuming, of course, that the individual is not incompetent, an infant, or otherwise

under the guardianship of another.
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gous nonbankruptcy situation leads to a similar result.
The trustee of an individual debtor assumes control over most
of the assets of that individual, just as he does in the case of a
corporate debtor.12 3 The trustee, however, does not control the individual himself; he cannot force the debtor to work, to change
jobs, or to do anything the individual debtor does not wish to do.
The trustee, in effect, has no more control over the activities of an
individual debtor than does a person who has purchased all of that
person's assets: he is only given the power to control the use of the
assets. The mere transfer of assets from one person to another does
not entail the transfer of the individual's attorney-client privilege
as well. 124 Thus, the change that occurs when an individual enters
bankruptcy is analogous to a sale of assets outside of bankruptcy,
which does not affect the individual's ability to control the attorney-client privilege. The trustee should therefore have no power to
waive an individual debtor's attorney-client privilege.
This difference in the treatment of corporations and individuals also makes sense in light of the nature of the attorney-client
privilege outside of bankruptcy. Outside of bankruptcy, corporate
directors may only assert the corporation's attorney-client privilege
in their capacity as agents of that entity. 12 5 When an individual
asserts his attorney-client privilege, however, he is asserting a privilege that is personal to him.12 6 Because directors who try to assert
the corporation's attorney-client privilege occupy a different position vis-A-vis the holder of the privilege than does an individual
asserting his own privilege, it is not surprising that nonbankruptcy
law should treat corporate directors and individuals differently.
Thus, the argument in Weintraub-accordingto which a trustee's
power to waive the attorney-client privilege of a corporate debtor
would discriminate against corporations-is fundamentally unsound: it completely neglects the nonbankruptcy difference, which
should be reflected in bankruptcy law, between directors asserting
a corporation's privilege and an individual asserting his own
privilege.

2I See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1302 (1984 Revision) (CRR) (granting the trustee power to
administer the individual debtor's estate); id. § 1306 (defining property of the estate in individual bankruptcies).
14 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
S'
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
"

See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Objections
The Weintraub court also examined the role of the trustee,
and concluded that the trustee was not like new management and
that the trustee should therefore have no power to control the
debtor's attorney-client privilege. 27 The court's reasoning, however, relied too heavily on labels. Relying upon the premise that
the trustee does not replace the corporation as a legal entity and
does not assume the legal office of the current corporate management, the court formalistically reasoned that the trustee fails to
succeed to the powers that are associated with those positions.128
This analysis ignores the reality of the transformation that occurs
when a corporation enters bankruptcy and is placed under the control of a trustee.129 The powers and duties given to the trustee are
so wide-ranging 3 0 that it is unrealistic to characterize the trustee
as anything other than new management. 1 Thus, this justification
put forth by the Weintraub court for denying the trustee the
power to waive the attorney-client privilege carries little force.
The Seventh Circuit also refused to allow the trustee to waive
the debtor's attorney-client privilege because it perceived that such
a holding would amount to discrimination among corporations
based on their economic status. 13

2

The court argued that solvent

corporations would be allowed to assert or to waive their privileges
127722 F.2d at 342.
128 Id.
129 In Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383, 386-87 (2d
Cir. 1982), the court relied upon the fact that the corporate debtor's directors had resigned,
leaving no representative of the estate other than the trustee, to conclude that the trustee
could waive the debtor's attorney-client privilege. The Weintraub court distinguished
Weissman on the ground that one of the directors was still in office and was thus capable of
waiving or asserting the privilege. Weintraub, 722 F.2d at 341. This factual distinction, however, is irrelevant since it has nothing to do with the reasons for appointing the trustee in
the first place. The trustee becomes the new management of the debtor precisely because
the checks on the behavior of the old management are no longer effective to safeguard the
interests of the corporation's new residual claimants. See supra notes 95-107 and accompanying text. To the extent that any checks would exist at all, old management would only be
bound to exercise control over the privilege in the interests of the corporation's "shareholders." Thus, in a situation in which old management, rather than the trustee, was allowed to
control the privilege, there would be no mechanism for ensuring that the privilege would be
exercised in the best interests of other investors (especially other residual claimants), who
usually have a greater stake in the benefits to be derived.
"' See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
131 See In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 13 Bankr. 54, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) ("[Tihe
trustee possesses and controls [the corporate debtor's] affairs, and subordinate management,
if any, serves at the trustee's pleasure."), aff'd, 13 Bankr. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd sub noma.
Weissman v. Hassett (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 670 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1982).
122
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by action of their elected officers while insolvent corporations
would be forced to bend to the will of the trustee.13 3 Implicit in
this argument is the assumption that the trustee will exercise the
debtor's attorney-client privilege to the detriment of the corporation, while the debtor's directors will not. This assumption, however, ignores the safeguard that is provided by the duties placed
upon the trustee. In the same way that the directors of the corporation, outside of bankruptcy, would be required to waive the privilege if the net result would be to increase profits,"' the trustee
should be permitted to waive the privilege if the result would be to
increase the assets of the estate. 185 Because the trustee's duties are
aligned with the interests of a corporate debtor's residual claimants in the same way that the duties of management outside of
bankruptcy are aligned with those of the shareholders, no "discrimination" against insolvent corporations would result from a
rule that gives the trustee control over the attorney-client privilege.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit asserted that allowing the trustee
I" Id. The court did not explain how the existence of such discrimination was relevant
to the analysis. Apparently, the court felt that it would somehow amount to unfair treatment of insolvent corporations. But a vague notion of unfairness is altogether unhelpful in
this context. A court might use a similar argument to deny a petition to place an insolvent
corporation into bankruptcy involuntarily; healthy corporations, after all, cannot be so "unfairly" treated.
If notions of "fairness" are to be introduced, the inquiry should focus on which categories of individuals are unfairly treated by a change in the substantive rules occasioned by
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Under the rule adopted by the court in Weintraub, the
only parties who get an advantage are the debtor's directors: they may retain control over
the attorney-client privilege, while in an analogous nonbankruptcy situation, they would
lose such control. Conversely, the debtor's residual claimants are disadvantaged because the
privilege might not be waived even though it would be in the best interest of the residual
claimants to do so.
134 This would be required under the directors' duty to maximize profits for the benefit
of shareholders. See supra notes 85, 89, 107 and accompanying text. The directors would
probably have a duty to waive the privilege, for example, if the resulting penalties that
might be assessed against the corporation would be less than the damages the corporation
might recover in a suit against one of the directors for breach of duty. See supra note 85
and accompanying text. The duty could exist even if the directors would be releasing information against their personal interests; failure to waive the privilege solely to avoid personal
liability could amount to self-dealing and thus be actionable by the corporation's shareholders. Cf. Tourea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 122, 412 P.2d 47, 57 (1966)
(in banc) (if a corporate officer "has a specific duty to act in regard to a particular matter as
a representative of the company" then he may not use that matter for his own benefit);
Equity Corp. v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 425, 431, 213 A.2d 439, 442 (1965) (the question is
whether the corporate fiduciary "has appropriated for himself something that in fairness
should belong to his corporation"); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Sup. Ct. 1939) ("[There shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.").
I" See supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text.
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in bankruptcy to waive a corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege would have a chilling effect on pre-petition communications
between corporate agents and corporate counsel because of a fear
of future bankruptcy."' 6 This argument, however, loses sight of
both the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and the intended
beneficiary of the privilege in nonbankruptcy law. The attorneyclient privilege strikes a delicate balance between two competing
demands: the need for full disclosure of information in order to
adjudicate disputes between parties and the need for clients to be
given adequate legal assistance from fully informed counsel.3 7 In
the corporate context, the attorney-client privilege allows the current employees of a corporation to discuss matters freely with corporate counsel; they engage in these discussions in their capacity
as the agents of the corporation's owners, for the benefit of those
owners. Under the balance struck by the privilege in nonbankruptcy law, the decision as to whether information will be disclosed
is left solely to the corporation's current management. At any
given time, only the agents immediately responsible for the management of the corporation may assert the privilege; no other parties may block the disclosure of information from the corporation's
counsel.' As a result, the former directors of a corporation cannot
prevent the disclosure of information that they gave to the corporation's counsel during their directorships.
The propriety of the balance that has already been struck in
13 722 F.2d at 343.

See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. Communications to corporate counsel
concerning actions by a corporation's employees raising the prospect of liability for both the
corporation and the employee may be an exception. The general rule is that when an employee communicates with corporate counsel on a matter involving the corporation, the privilege belongs to the corporation unless the individual has established a personal attorneyclient relationship with the counsel. See United States v. Piccini, 412 F.2d 591, 593 (2d Cir.
1969); Comment, The Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
the Corporation,39 FORDHAm L. Rav. 281, 293 (1970). This rule has the effect of forcing the
employee to raise the issue of individual representation, thereby allowing corporate counsel
to decline such representation if he feels there could be a conflict. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSiONAL RESPONsmILrrY EC 5-18 (1981). If a personal attorney-client relationship exists between the employee and the corporate counsel, however, the corporation may not
force counsel to disclose information covered by the individual privilege without the consent
of the employee. See In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503, 506 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984); Continental Oil
Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 348-50 (9th Cir. 1964). While the addition of an attorney-client relationship between corporate counsel and an employee or director would complicate the situation, it would not alter the analysis presented in this comment. If the privileged information is also within the scope of the employee's own attorney-client privilege,
waiver by the trustee would be subject to the same conditions, including consent of the
individual, as would waiver by management outside of bankruptcy.
137
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nonbankruptcy law between the need for disclosure and the need
for consultation is not a bankruptcy question. Nor is it a concern
of bankruptcy law to determine whether it is appropriate for directors to be faced with the possibility that at some later time they
may no longer control the corporation's attorney-client privilege.
Such considerations are the proper concern only of nonbankruptcy
law. As a procedural mechanism designed to facilitate a collective
proceeding, bankruptcy should do nothing more than mirror the
rights that the parties would have had in the absence of the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. " 9 The chilling effect on communications
emphasized by the court in Weintraub is not a creation of bankruptcy law; rather it is the result of the nonbankruptcy rule that
allows only the current agents of the corporation to waive the privilege. Butner and the principles underlying a collective proceeding
require that bankruptcy law reflect nonbankruptcy rights; those
rights should not be reallocated in a manner thought to be more
desirable apart from considerations unique to the bankruptcy
mechanism.14 0 Thus, in considering the chilling effect that would

result from giving trustees the power to control the attorney-client
privilege, the Seventh Circuit was not providing an argument that
has any special relevance to bankruptcy. It was, rather, an argu139 See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text; cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S.
48, 56 (1979) ("[T]he federal bankruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary to
ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he
would have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued.").
140 It might be argued that a consideration unique to bankruptcy does indeed exist in
this context because the chilling effect on disclosure by management would be especially
strong immediately prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition-just when a corporation's
management is most in need of the advice of informed counsel. See 73 ILL. B.J. 112, 116
(1984). Such an argument, however, is insufficient to justify an alteration of the nonbankruptcy rule within bankruptcy because such situations do not in fact arise only in the bankruptcy context. There are similar instances outside of bankruptcy where informed legal advice is critical to the corporation's management, while at the same time loss of control of the
attorney-client privilege by the existing directors may be imminent. An example of this
arises when a corporation is the target of a hostile tender offer. The directors of the target
corporation need to know what legal measures they can can take to resist the takeover attempt, but it is well-settled that, if the takeover is successful, the new management will
have control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications
taking place prior to the takeover, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. There is no
reason to suspect that the chilling effect on communications or the need for informed legal
advice would be any greater in the imminent-bankruptcy situation than in the imminenttakeover situation; thus, it would be improper to upset within bankruptcy the balance already struck by nonbankruptcy law. The point is strengthened by noting the perverse incentives that would result from using different rules in these two very similar contexts: if a
hostile takeover attempt appeared likely to succeed, the corporation's directors would have
an incentive to file a petition for bankruptcy in order to maintain control over the attorneyclient privilege with respect to earlier communications. See supra notes 55-56.
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ment that should first be addressed to the underlying nonbankruptcy rule.
CONCLUSION

Under the Supreme Court's decision in Butner v. United
States, the appropriate starting place in deciding whether the trustee has the power to waive a debtor's attorney-client privilege is
nonbankruptcy law. Under nonbankruptcy law, only the current
directors of a corporation control the corporation's attorney-client
privilege, while an individual has complete and permanent dominion over his own privilege. Because the appointment of a trustee
within bankruptcy is equivalent to a change in corporate management outside of bankruptcy, the control of the corporation's attorney-client privilege should pass to the trustee. In the case of an
individual debtor, however, the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy resembles a mere sale of assets outside of bankruptcy.
Thus, the trustee should not be able to assert or waive an individual's attorney-client privilege.
William R. Mitchelson, Jr.

